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The Principle of Compositionality was first formulated by the German philosopher
Gottlob Frege (1892) and is also referred as the Frege principle. The principle states that
the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its parts. A mapping
from expressions to meanings that satisfies this principle is called compositional.F r e g e
identified compositionality as a basic requirement for an account of the meaning of
natural language, and all present serious accounts of sentence meaning are compositional.
Therefore, current research seeks to find more restrictive notions of compositionality that
can be used to assign a degree of compositionality to a semantic analysis as discussed
below. The question of compositionality has also been asked for non-linguistic
communication systems among humans and other species, which I mention towards the
end.
For a semantics of natural language, compositionality is a basic requirement because
humans can generate infinitely many sentences (see DISCRETE INFINITY) and associate
them with one from an infinite set of meanings. Since human memory is a finite
resource, there can only be a finite set of memorized lexical meanings (see LEXICAL
SEMANTICS). It follows that natural language must contain non-lexical expressions and
that the meaning of such non-lexical expressions is determined by a compositional
procedure. Therefore, compositionality is a necessary of property of any semantics of
natural language that claims complete coverage. The result, however, leaves it open what
the lexical expressions of natural language are and how many composition principles
there are. Often words can be assigned a compositional meaning: for example the
meaning of slept is the result of sleep combined with past tense. In other cases, however,
syntactically complex phrases seem to have a non-compositional meaning: for example,
that kick the bucket is synonymous with die does not follow naturally from the meanings
of kick and the bucket (cf. IDIOMS). In the history of language, complex expressions
often take on a non-compositional meaning over time (cf. GRAMMATICALIZATION.)The composition principles are closely tied to a particular semantic theory.
Compositionality plays a central role in FORMAL SEMANTICS and TRUTH
CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS of natural language, while other theories of language
meaning have not addressed compositionality (cf. CONSTRUCTION GRAMMARS,
COGNITIVE GRAMMAR). The textbook by Heim and Kratzer (1998) provides one
influential account. This account assumes that humans construct a syntactic
representation of a sentence, the LOGICAL FORM, which is then mapped at the
SYNTAX-SEMANTICS INTERFACE to a meaning. This mapping is a recursive
procedure (cf. RECURSIVITY): Lexical items are mapped to the memorized lexical
meaning. The meaning of a complex phrase, which are assumed to always consist of
exactly two sub-phrase that may themselves be complex, however, is determined by one
of three compositional procedures. Which compositional procedure is applied is
determined by the types of the meanings of the two parts of the complex phrase. The
most frequent case is that the meaning of one sub-phrase is a function while the other is a
a potential argument of the function. In this case, the meaning of the complex phrase is
given by functional application. The two other composition principles are used for
modification and for variable binding. In this way, three composition principles and a
finite set of lexical meaning rules determine the interpretation of infinitely many
sentences.
Recent work has pointed out a need to develop a stricter formal notion of
compositionality. One motivation is the following theorem of Zadrozny (1994): If there
is a function that assigns to each complete expression of a language a meaning, a
compositional meaning function can also be given. This result relies on an extension of
function beyond their natural domain. For example, we might construct a compositional
semantics for the idiom kick the bucket in the following way: For one, stipulate that the
bucket has in addition to its ordinary meaning also the special symbol X as its meaning.
Secondly, define the meaning of kick applied to X as the meaning of die. Then the
meaning of kick the bucket is compositionally defined as the meaning of kick applied to
the meaning of the bucket. However, this result strikes most researchers as intuitively
undisirable. For this reasons, current research tries to formulate notions of
compositionality stricter than Frege's that capture this intuitive difference (Kazmi and
Pelletier 1998, Szabó 2000). In particular, Kazmi and Pelletier suggest to restrict the use
of functions as meanings, but it is still an open question how exactly to do this (cf.
Lappin and Zadrozny 2000).
Looking beyond human language, compositionality has emerged as an important property
to classify communication systems. Horton (2001) investigates the compositionality of
music (see MUSIC, LANGUAGE AND). Even more interesting is the case of animal
communication and human evolution (Bickerton 1990). Spelke (2003) proposes that the
compositional semantics is crucial for human intelligence. She argues that humans and
higher animals possess a similar ability to form basic concepts. Only humans, however,
via the compositional semantics of language have the ability to combine these basic
concepts into an infinite array of derived concepts (see ANIMAL COMMUNICATION
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